Public Employment—Color-Conscious Quota Relief: A Constitutional Remedy for Racial Employment Discrimination by unknown
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 11
January 1976
Public Employment—Color-Conscious Quota
Relief: A Constitutional Remedy for Racial
Employment Discrimination
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Public Employment—Color-Conscious Quota Relief: A Constitutional Remedy for Racial Employment Discrimination, 11 Urb. L. Ann. 333
(1976)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol11/iss1/15
COLOR-CONSCIOUS QUOTA RELIEF:
A CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY FOR
RACIAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Racially discriminatory hiring practices are especially pernicious
because of their effect on a person's ability to provide for his family in the
job of his choice.' The problems faced in attempting to ameliorate
continuing racial discrimination in employment are particularly
complex and incapable of resolution by simple judicial reprimand.
While court-ordered quotas may provide a cure for the past harms of
such discrimination, the remedy may fail to survive constitutional
scrutiny, since the guarantee of equal protection of the law applies to
both minority and white employment applicants. 2
In NAACP v. Allen 3 a class action was brought to desegregate the all-
white Alabama State Police. 4 Plaintiffs5 based their claim on the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.6 Finding evidence of racial discrimination, 7 the
1. See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend.XIV,§ 1; see Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d315, 325(8th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
3. 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
4. The NAACP was able to establish a convincing prima facie case of discrimination at
the trial level. It was shown that, in the 37 year history of the Alabama State Police, there
had never been a black state trooper. The Alabama Department of Public Safety (DPS)
employed 650 state troopers, 26 troopercadets and 279 support personnel. The State Police
also maintained a force of 500 unpaid, volunteer, reserve state troopers, who were selected
by the DPS. The Department of Personnel conducts the Alabama Merit System and, in
conjunction with the DPS, hired all but five of the DPS employees. These five nonmerit
employees, who worked as laborers, were the only blacks employed by the DPS. Id. at 616.
5. The NAACP represented the class composed of its members and all similarly situated
blacks in the State of Alabama. Phillip Paradise, Jr., a black state police applicant,
intervened individually and on behalf of the class represented by the NAACP. The United
States was ordered by the district court to participate as a party and amicus curiae. Id.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). The Act provides: "It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race .... " Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1970). The Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. II, 1972), was enacted on March 24, 1972,
subsequent to the district court decision, NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala.
1972), and prior to the court of appeals decision, NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.
1974). For the first time, state agencies and political subdivisions were brought under the
restrictions of Title VII. This expansion was accomplished by including within the
definition of "person," which is a part of the statutory definition of "employer," the
following- "governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions .... 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
7. One of the most common methods of proving such discrimination is to create a
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district court issued a decree ordering the Alabama Department of
Public Safety to hire one qualified black trooper for each qualified white
trooper hired until blacks composed approximately twenty-five percent
of the force.8 On appeal, the State of Alabama contended that eligible
white applicants would be subjected to reverse discrimination in
violation of the equal protection clause.9 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, however, rejected the State's position and affirmed the
district court decree.1 0
When discrimination is shown to exist and there is no exception
justifying its existence," Title VII provides for an active judicial role. 12
statistical presumption. A prima facie case of discrimination will be established by the
presentation of statistical evidence showing a wide disparity between the percentage of
blacks working for the employer in question and the percentage of blacks in the total
population of the locality. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 197 1),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974); United States v. Carpenters Local 169,457 F.2d 210,211
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972). The employer then has the burden of either
disproving the statistical presumption or proving the existence of a statutorily or
constitutionally valid reason for the disparity. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
494 F.2d 211, 223 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Carpenters Local 169, supra at 211.
Plaintiffs in Allen created the statistical presumption, and defendants failed to carry their
burden in rebuttal. 340 F. Supp. at 705, aff'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
8. 340 F. Supp. at 706-07. Chief Judge Johnson's injunctive decree, ordering a hiring
ratio, also applied to police cadets, auxiliary state troopers, and support personnel. The
decree ordered the defendants to take specific affirmative action to advertise and recruit
qualified black applicants.
9. 493 F.2d at 617.
10. Id. at 622.
11. An exception to Title VII's ban on racial discrimination exists if there is an
"overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of the business .... " Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). Business purpose is defined as having three
criteria. First, it must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact. Secondly.
no other available alternative having a less discriminatory impact can exist. Finally, the
business practice must accomplish its stated purpose. This strict limitation of the business
purpose exception conforms to the demands of the compelling governmental interest test
applied in these situations. See notes 29-30 infra. One instance when the exception has
been allowed was presented in Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir.
1972). In Spurlock the Tenth Circuit acquiesced in United Airlines' racially dis-
criminatory hiring procedure for flight officers in light of the overriding need for safety in
that part of the airline industry. Id. at 219.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970); see Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330 (8th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,443 F.2d 5 1t,
553 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Irvin v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 308 F. Supp.
152, 160 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
To rebut a charge of discrimination, the employer may prove that his employment
practices are fair on their face and that he has no intent to discriminate. It is, however, the
"consequences" of the employer's acts that the court will examine. See Griggs v. Duke
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The court has not only the power, but the duty, to order a decree
sufficient to prohibit racial discrimination.' 3 Title VII authorizes the
use of affirmative relief as a remedy for intentional discrimination.
14
"Intentional," in the context of the statute, simply means that the
employer's acts were not accidentally performed.' 5 Affirmative judicial
relief for Title VII violations has included color:-conscious hiring
ratios.' 6 While on its face Title VII appears to ban remedies that
Power Co. 401 U.S. 424,430 (1971); Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F.•Supp. 401,403 (C.D.
Cal. 1970), modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). If the employer has discriminated in the
past, and the employer's present neutral policies have done nothing to alleviate the effects
of past discrimination, a violation of Title VII is still established. Rowev. General Motors
Corp., -157 F.2d 348,355(5th Cir. 1972); see United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301,
307 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973); Papermakers Local 189 v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980, 991 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); United States v.
Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532, 557 (W.D.N.C. 1971). Good faith or present
neutral employment practices do not create an exception to the restrictions of Title VII. See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); Walston v. County School Bd., 492
F.2d 919, 921 (5th Cir. 1974). For a general discussion of the "effect" theory and its
application see Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d210(7thCir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 11t1 (1974); 8 URBAN L. ANN. 265 (1974).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 216 (7th Cir.), cert.
denzed, 409 U.S. 851 (1972) (employment); UnitedStatesv. JacksonvilleTerminal Co., 451
F.2d 418,458 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972) (employment); Hutchings v.
United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 310 (5th Cir. 1970) (employment); Papermakers
Local 189 v. UnitedStates, 416 F.2d980,990 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970)
(employment & union); Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir. 1969)
(employment & union). See generally Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)
(voting).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), provides: "[i]f the court finds that the respondent has
intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice
... the court may . . . order such affirmative action as may be appropriate .... The
courts have held that "this grant of authority should be broadly read and applied so as to
effectively tuminate the [discriminatory] practice and make its victims whole." Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 721 (7th Cir. 1969). See also United States v.
Ironworkers Local 86,443 F.2d 544,553 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984(1971); Irvin v.
Mohawk Rubber Co., 308 F. Supp. 152, 160 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
15. United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532, 559 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
This interpretation of the statutory requirement of "intent" must be viewed in reference to
the court's primary concentration on the consequences or effect of the employer's acts.
Therefore, the resolution of the issue of the consequences of the employer's discriminatory
practices will lead to the determination of the necessity for affirmative relief. See note 12
supra.
16. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895
(1971); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 377 (8th Cir. 1973); UnitedStates v.
Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); UnitedStates
v. Carpenters Local 169,457 F.2d210, 211 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972); Carter
v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86,443 F.2d 544,553 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971);
NAACP v. Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507, 520-23 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1017(lst Cir. 1974).
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incorporate preferential treatment based on race, 7 the Act does not
prevent the use of racial quotas for the purpose of eliminating past
discrimination. The anti-preferential treatment clause has been
construed only to prohibit the use of racial quotas implemented for the
sole purpose of insuring racial balance."8
Racial discrimination in certain employment situationst9 can also be
attacked on a constitutiopal basis by utilizing the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause.2 0 Once a violation of the
fourteenth amendment has been proven,2' a court, exercising its equity
powers, may order affirmative action to remedy the situation.22
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
18. "[Wlhile quotas merely to attain racial balance are forbidden, quotas to correct past
discriminatory practices are not." United States v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 413 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); see, e.g., UnitedStates v. Electrical Workers Local
38, 428 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); United States v. Pipefitters
Local 638, 347 F. Supp. 169, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Developments in the Law-
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1109, 1242 (1971).
19. The fourteenth amendment equal protection clause is applicable only when state
action exists. The state action in Allen is the operation of the state police. See Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
20. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (park); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S.
399 (1964) (voting); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (education); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (restaurant); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (education); Reynolds v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 148 F.2d 754 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 746 (1954) (employment); Everett v. Riverside Hose Co. No. 4,
Inc., 261 F. Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (employment). It must be remembered that the
Constitution does not guarantee a right to public employment, Cafeteria Workers Local
473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961), or a right to proportional representation of
minorities in any particular program, North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402
U.S. 43, 46 (1971). The Constitution only guarantees equal employment opportunity
through the equal protection clause. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d614, 621 (SthCir. 1974); see
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971). Even though there is noguaranteed
right to proportional representation of minorities, this fact does not prevent the court from
utilizing the percentages of blacks to whites in the total population of the local community
as an approximate standard to judge when the past effects of discrimination in a program
have been eliminated. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 706 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 493
F.2d 614 (1974); see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971).
21. The discussion of effect versus purpose set out in the discussion of Title VII is
applicable to the equal protection clause. See note 12 supra.
22. Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 16
W. REs. L. REv. 478, 489 (1965); see United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962);
Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 863,857 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956).
The broad powers of equity are sufficiently flexible to remedy continuing discrimination.
Dowell v. Board of Educ. 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1272 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972); see, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
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Depending upon the extent of the racial discrimination and pursuant to
the equal protection clause, the courts have ordered race-conscious
remedies that include definite ratios and percentages of blacks to
whites.2 3 The scope of the remedy is determined by the extent of the
violation,24 and the standard for reviewing a district court's exercise of its
equity jurisdiction is whether or not the judge abused his discretion.2 5
When racial classifications are incorporated in judicial remedies, the
classifications have been attacked by whites alleging reverse discrimina-
tion.2 6 The equal protection clause not only acts as the basis for the
application of racial hiring percentages, but it also is a restriction on the
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16(1971); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry Inc., 361 U.S. 288,291
(1960); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F .2d 1333, 1340
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Carter v Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315,324(8th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
The general principles applicable to the framing of an equity decree do not vary
according to the subject matter of the case before the court. "[A] school desegregation case
does not differ fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable
remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right. The task is to correct by a balancing
of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution."
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., supra. at 15-16 (1971).
23. In the area of education the courts have freely utilized color-conscious remedies that
incorporate racial ratios and percentages to stop discrimination. See, e.g., Davis v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 35 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1971); Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100, 110 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413
U.S. 919 (1973); United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 433 F.2d 619,620-21 (5th Cir.
1970); Singleton v.Jackson Municipal SeparateSchool Dist., 419 F.2d 1211, 1218(5th Cir.),
cert. dented, 396 U.S. 1032 (1970). "The Constitution is both color blind and color
conscious .... [T]he Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being
perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination." United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836,876(5th Cir. 1966), aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). The courts have upheld requirements, promulgated by
executive order, that certain recipients of federal contracts institute affirmative action
programs. These programs include racial hiring ratios and percentages. Southern Ill.
Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 470 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1972); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v.
Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 175 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). Color-
conscious hiring ratios have also been ordered under the equal protection clause and Title
VII. See, e.g., Vulcan Soc'y, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 399 (2d Cir. 1973);
Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333,1340 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School
Dist., 462 F.2d 1112, 1115 (5th Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330 (8th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
24. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
25. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 185 (1944); United States v.
Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800, 804 (4th Cir. 1970).
26. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d315, 324(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950(1972);
see notes 35-36 infra.
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use of the quota.27 " Although not unconstitutional per se, 28 racial
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny by the courts.2 9 A judicial
remedy incorporating a quota maybe upheld for a compelling interest,30
and courts have not been reluctant to find a compelling interest
justifying the racial remedy in employment discrimination cases.3' The
27. See note 29 infra. Federal classifications based on race would be subject to the fifth
amendment due process clause. The concept of equal protection of the law has been held to
be a part of the fifth amendment due process clause because "discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499(1954);
see, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78,81(1971); Shapirov. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
641-42 (1969); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964).
28. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214,216 (1944); Developments in the Law -Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1103 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]; 56 MINN. L. REv. 842, 866
(1972). It has been argued by some members of the Supreme Court that racial
classifications of any kind are unconstitutional per se. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312, 343-44 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)
(Stewart, J., concurring). This rule, however, has never been accepted by a majority of the
Supreme Court.
29. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court:A Modelfora Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1,
24 (1972); Developments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1088; 56 MINN. L. REv. 842, 866
(1972); 34 U. P=TT. L. REv. 130, 137 (1972).
It has been suggested that benign racial quotas, racial quotas used for the purpose of
prohibiting discrimination, should be subject to a less stringent equal protection test. See
Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public School: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L.
REv. 564, 579-80 (1965); Developments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1107-11. The
continued utilization of the compelling interest test, however, will prevent, by its stringent
limitations, every population group from demanding this severe form of relief in
circumstances which do not warrant its use.
A question exists whether a different standard should be used in analyzing a voluntarily
imposed racial quota as opposed to a judicially ordered quota. The reverse discrimination
that plaintiff alleges he is subject to is the same whether a court or a private party institutes
the quota. Therefore, the equal protection test that is used should not vary based on the
factor of voluntariness. In fact, courts reviewing voluntary quotas have used the same
equal protection test that other courts have utilized in considering racial classifications.
See Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 1257 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971);
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 32,507 P.2d 1169,1182 (1973), vacated per curiam as
moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); 8 URBAN L. ANN. 311 (1974).
30. Compelling interest means that the racial classification's "objective could not be
attained by a measure which did not draw racial distinctions, but also that the public
interest involved outweighs the detriments that will be incurred by the affected private
parties." Developments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1103. In calculating the "public
interest," the court should look to "the benefits accruing to society and the degree of risk
which will be incurred if a measure of that nature is not permitted." Id. The actual
"detriments" should be discovered "by examining both the importance of the individual
or group rights infringed and the extent to which the measure will have long-term adverse
effects on those interests." Id.
31. There are numerous examples of racial classifications that have been properly
[Vol. 11:333
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use of quotas, however, has not been accepted as a general judicial
prescription. 2 Illustrative of this position is Carter v. Gallagher33 in
which the Eighth Circuit held the district court's racial hiring remedy
unconstitutional.34 In. Carter the Minneapolis Fire Department was
ordered by the district court to give an absolute hiring preference to the
next twenty qualified minority applicants. The Eighth Circuit decided
that this specific remedy constituted reverse discrimination in violation
of the equal protection clause. 5 The Supreme Court, however, has not
definitively ruled on this issue.3 6
In Allen the existence of racial discrimination was not seriously at
issue in the court of appeals.3 7 The only real issue decided by the Fifth
Circuit was the constitutionality of the racial quota ordered by the
applied. See, e.g., Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944
(1971) (employment); Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1968)
(employment); Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967) (education); NAACP v.
Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974) (employment).
32. As a result, courts issue restricted racial quotas. See note 27 supra.
33. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
34. Id. at 325. In Carter a class action on behalf of certain minority groups, based on the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause and Title VII, sought injunctive relief
against discriminatory hiring practices by the Minneapolis Fire Department.
35. Id. The court in Carter then went on to hold that a one-to-two, qualified black to
qualified white, hiring ratio, which will remain in effect until 20 qualified minority
members are hired, is constitutional. According to the Carter court, the one-to-two ratio
remedy is not a "quota" and is constitutional, where as the remedy of only hiring blacks for
the next 20 positions is unconstitutional, because:
[Als soon as the trial court's order is fully implemented, all hirings will be on a
racially nondiscriminatory basis, and it could well be that many more minority
persons or less, as compared to the population at large, over a long period of time
would apply and qualify for the positions.
Id. at 330-31. This distinction is invalid, since as soon as the 20 qualified minority
members are hired, pursuant to the district court's plan in Carter, the hiring would also be
on a racially neutral basis. Therefore, the fact that the hiring procedure will eventually be
racially neutral does not distinguish between these two remedies.
The claim of reverse discrimination stated by the Eighth Circuit is highly improper.
Whether the remedy which calls for the absolute preference for 20 qualified blacks or the
remedy which calls for the one-to-two, qualified black to qualified white, hiring ratio,
until 20 blacks are hired, is instituted, some qualified whites are going to be passed over in
favor of a qualified black. Faced with this fact, there is either a compelling government
interest and it is valid to use a racial quota and pass over a qualified white, or there is no
compelling interest and it is unconstitutional to pass over a qualified white. The court in
Allen frames the compelling interest in a way that would make both tests in Carter
constitutional. See text at note 40 infra.
36. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (the court avoided an opportunity to
rule on reverse discrimination by dismissing the case as moot).
37. 493 F.2d at 617; see note 4 supra. Confronted with an overwhelming numerical
presumption of discrimination, the only defenses the court could have accepted would
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district court. Concentrating on the factual basis for the racial quota, the
court concluded that the scope of the remedy was neither dispropor-
tionate to the extent of the violation 3 nor inconsistent with the response
of other courts faced with similar employment discrimination
situations.3 9 Focusing on the constitutional basis for the remedy, the
court found a compelling governmental interest justifying the
imposition of a racial hiring quota. It declared that, "It is the collective
interest, governmental as well as social, in effectively ending un-
constitutional racial discrimination, that justifies temporary, carefully
circumscribed resort to racial criteria. ' 40  The significance of this
remedy lies in the Fifth Circuit's clear definition of the limits that would
govern the application of racial quotas as a judicial remedy for racial
discrimination in employment. In Allen the court listed four valid
restrictions on the utilization of racial hiring quotas.41 First, their
application should be limited by the traditional views of comity and
judicial restraint. 42 Secondly, racial hiring quotas should be used only as
have been proof of a valid business purpose or a compelling state interest. The State of
Alabama concentrated, however, on demonstrating other facts in an attempt to prove good
faith and neutral employment practices. Brief for Defendants at 4, NAACP v. Allen, 340 F.
Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972). The State also argued that under the district court's order less
qualified blacks would be hired over more qualified whites. The court of appeals
dismissed this contention as illogical because the state trooper selection process had not
been shown to be nondiscriminatory or job-related. Therefore, the present standing of any
applicant on the police force's job eligibility lists cannot be used as a basis for a
constitutional argument. 493 F.2d at 618; see note 44 infra. The State also attempted to
demonstrate graphically that the federal government was more guilty of racial
discrimination in employment than was Alabama. Brief for Defendants, supra, at 3. Since
Alabama was unable to prove either a valid business purpose or a compelling government
interest, the State was found to be in violation of both Title VII and the equal protection
clause. 493 F.2d at 616-17.
38. 493 F.2d at 620-21. There was irrebuttable proof of a long history of intentional racial
discrimination. The State of Alabama's efforts at desegregation were considered
insignificant by the two reviewing federal courts.
39. See Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1975);
Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
40. 493 F.2d at 619. The state agency involved is a police force. This fact must not be
overlooked in the equal protection balancing process. "This is a police department and the
visibility of the Black patrolman in the community is a decided advantage forall segments
of the public at a time when racial divisiveness is plaguing law enforcement." Bridgeport
Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1341 (2d Cir. 1973).
41. 493 F.2d at 621.
42. Id. See generally note 31-32 supra. Inherent in this limitation is the concept that
"[j]udicial authority enters only when local authority defaults." Swann v. Charlotte-
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a temporary remedy.43 Thirdly, only minority members who are
qualified for the position should be hired.4" Finally, the racial remedy
should be reserved for those circumstances in which no other alternative
is available. 4
The racial remedy fashioned by the district court in Allen complies
with the preceding standards established by the Fifth Circuit. Since the
scope of the remedy is related to the extent of the violation, the district
court judge did not abuse his discretion by ordering the quota. 46 When
the Alabama State Police force is approximately twenty-five percent
black, the temporary hiring ratios will be replaced by a racially neutral
hiring procedure.4 7 Before being hired as a state trooper, the minority
applicant must successfully complete the entrance examinations and the
training courses.48 The district court therefore concluded, on the basis of
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,16(1971). Even when this "default" occurs, the court
,s limited to fashioning a remedy equal to the nature of the violation. Id. The court cannot
step beyond this traditional limitation.
43. "It is a temporary remedy that seeks to spend itself as promptly as it can by creating a
climate in which objective, neutral employment criteria can successfully operate ......
493 F.2d at 621. See, e.g., Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294, 301 n.10 (5th Cir.
1968); Developments in the Law,supra note28, at 1104; cf. Korematsuv. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
Since the court will determine the duration of the quota standard, the burden of proof
will be on the employer to show that the discrimination has been eliminated if he wants the
quota standard to be dropped before the time period set by the court ends. Morrow v.
Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974).
44. "[I]t is not the purpose of quota relief to require that anyone who lacks job-related
qualifications be employed." 493 F.2d at 618. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 430 (1971); United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 471 F.2d 582, 593 (4th Cir. 1972).
The standard defense of an employer charged with racial employment discrimination is
that there are no qualified minority members available to fill the employer's needs. This
defense has rarely been accepted by the court. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053,
1055-56 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1975); United Statesv. N.L. Indus., Inc.,
479 F.2d 354, 371 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 120 (5th
Cir. 1972). But cf. Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972). In Allen
the court observed that since the issuance of the district court's injunctive order, 325 blacks
had passed the qualifying examination for state troopers. 493 F.2d at 621.
45. "It is a form of relief which should be reserved for those situations in which less
restrictive means have failed or in which the chancellor could reasonably foresee that they
would fail." 493 F.2d at 621. See, e.g., Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134, 1136-37 (4th Cir.
1973); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1340
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); United States v. Lathers Local 46,471 F.2d
408, 414 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
46. 493 F.2d at 620-21. See generally notes 32-33 supra.
47. 493 F.2d at 621.
,18. Id.
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the pervasiveness of the discrimination 49 and the lack of response to an
earlier court order banning state police support personnel hiring
practices, 50 that the only practical judicial remedy is one incorporating a
racial quota.51
Allen stands for the principle that, when confronted with continuing
racial discrimination in employment, a court has the duty to fashion a
remedy sufficient to eliminate the discrimination. The remedy may take
the form of an affirmative hiring procedure that utilized color-conscious
ratios and percentages. Consistent with the prevailing judicial
interpretation, the use of racial classifications in fashioning a remedy to
overcome racial employment discrimination was held in Allen to be
within the discretion of the court. Allen is significant not only for
reaffirming the constitutionality of color-conscious quota relief, but
also for clearly presenting the restrictions on the utilization of the racial
remedy. Those restrictions by definition will prevent misuse of this
drastic judicial remedy and will guide courts dealing with the problem
of racial discrimination in employment in the future52 It is hoped that
the restrictions on the racial remedy's application, as articulated in
Allen, will allay the fear and distrust of quotas. A backlash 53 against this
type of remedy could destroy a practical answer to the problem of racial
discrimination in employment and frustrate effective implementation
of true equal employment opportunity.
5 4
Ronald R. Urbach
49. See note 4 supra.
50. United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970). The Alabama
Department of Personnel was permanently enjoined from racial discrimination in its
hiring practices.
51. 493 F.2d at 621.
52. Since the court of appeals in Allen stated that its decision is limited to the particular
facts of Allen, the specific effect of this decision in areas other than racial discrimination in
employment is uncertain. 493 F.2d at 418.
53. Racial quotas have not been limited to employment discrimination. They have been
widely utilized in the desegregation of schools. See note 23 supra. In the area of housing,
the concept of limited racial quotas has also been upheld. See Otero v. New York City
Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D.
Ohio 1972), modified, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973).
54. On July 18, 1974, Mr. Justice Powell, at the request of the State of Alabama, entered
an order extending the time for filing a petition forwrit of certiorari in NAACP v. Allen to
and including September 16, 1974. The NAACP's attorney indicated that the Alabama
Attorney General has decided not to file a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court. Letter from Joseph J. Levin, Jr. to Ronald R. Urbach, Oct. 7, 1974, on file with
Urban Law Annual.
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